DOES GOD HAVE THE
MORAL STANDING TO BLAME?
Patrick Todd

In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion—the problem of divine moral standing—and explain how this problem is distinct from
(albeit related to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often
conflated). In short, the problem is this: given how God would be (or, on some
conceptions, is) “involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral
standing to blame us for performing those very actions? In light of the recent
literature on “moral standing,” I consider God’s moral standing to blame on
two models of “divine providence”: open theism and theological determinism. I contend that God may have standing on open theism, and—perhaps
surprisingly—may also have standing even on theological determinism, given
the truth of compatibilism. The topic of this paper thus sheds considerable
light on the traditional philosophical debate about the conditions of moral
responsibility.

The history of the relationship between theistic belief and moral responsibility is both long and complex. In the theistic context, perhaps the central
problem regarding human moral responsibility has been this: how does
God’s control over what happens leave room for the sort of creaturely control necessary for moral responsibility? A central challenge for traditional
theists has thus always been to articulate and defend an account of God’s
causal control over the world that respects and preserves human responsibility. Such theories divide according to familiar lines; broadly speaking,
incompatibilists about responsibility and determinism have endorsed
“open theism” or “Molinism,” whereas compatibilists have endorsed what
might be called “theological determinism.” And, broadly speaking, the
former accuse the latter of eliminating creaturely responsibility; the latter
accuse the former of eliminating divine sovereignty. Such is the familiar
dialectic.
According to the major theistic religions, however, God does not simply
make us responsible; God furthermore holds us responsible. But the claim
that God holds us responsible raises substantial new difficulties beyond
those entailed by the claim that God makes us responsible. In particular,
from the mere fact that a given agent is blameworthy, it does not follow
that just any further agent is well-positioned morally to blame her. Accordingly, from the mere fact that God has made us responsible, it does not
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follow that God is well-positioned morally to hold us responsible. In the
terminology employed in a recent (and growing) literature, even if we are
blameworthy, it doesn’t follow that God has the moral standing to blame.
After all, God would seem to be intimately involved in our wrongdoing.
And even if God’s involvement in our wrongdoing indeed leaves us responsible, it may nevertheless imply that God lacks the moral standing to
criticize that very wrongdoing. In sum, even if we are blameworthy, we
may nevertheless be able appropriately to say to God, “Who are you to
blame me?”
The first goal of this paper is therefore to motivate a new problem
within the philosophy of religion: the problem of divine moral standing.
I say that this is a “new” problem, not because no philosophers or theologians have previously addressed the problem at issue; as we’ll see shortly,
many have, at least indirectly.1 I say that the problem is “new” because, as
I also hope to show, the problem has not received the detailed and careful
articulation it would seem to deserve. In particular, the problem of God’s
standing is often conflated with a related problem with which it is never
theless importantly distinct: the problem of evil. As I aim to bring out,
however, it is conceptually possible that whereas God is morally perfect
(and so the problem of evil is solved), nevertheless God lacks standing; and
it is furthermore conceptually possible that whereas the person at issue is
not morally perfect (and so is not “God”), this person nevertheless has
standing. Given these distinctions, we must be clear: are we challenging
(or defending) God’s perfection—or instead God’s standing?
The second goal of this paper is to address the question it means to
raise, namely, whether God has the moral standing to blame. My answer
is as follows: So long as God gives us free will, then God will have the
standing to blame. (Whether, given certain other salient facts, God could
be perfect is, however, another matter, and one I won’t address.) In particular, I consider two “models of providence” at opposite ends of the
theological spectrum—open theism, and theological determinism—and
assess whether, on those models, God has the standing to blame God’s
creatures when those creatures do wrong. (I will assume that, if God has
standing even on theological determinism, God will also have standing
on the intermediate position, Molinism.2) Perhaps surprisingly, I contend
that, in both cases, the answer is yes. On open theist assumptions, I shall
argue, and as I suspect many will grant, there is no clear reason why God
should lack the standing to blame. The case of theological determinism,
however, is substantially more difficult. In the bulk of the paper, then, I
argue that, given compatibilism, the God of theological determinism indeed
1
After this paper was accepted, however, I learned of Churchill’s paper, “Determinism
and Divine Blame,” which is (as of my current writing) forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy.
Churchill’s paper—which I hope to interact with in future work—also takes up the question
of the divine moral standing to blame.
2
And any yet further intermediary positions besides, e.g., what Kvanvig (Destiny and
Deliberation, xiii) calls the “Arminianism” (chapters 4–8).
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will have the standing to blame. Accordingly, if you want to maintain that
God could not possibly appropriately blame those God determines, then
you will have to abandon compatibilism. The project of this paper, as I
hope will become clear, thus has substantial implications for the traditional debate about the conditions of moral responsibility.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, I take up the question: What
are the conditions on having the “standing to blame”? The contemporary
discussion of “moral standing” was arguably inaugurated by G. A. Cohen’s
important paper, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?,” and this is where I begin my discussion. Cohen
proposes two conditions on having “moral standing”: a non-hypocrisy
condition, and—more importantly, for our purposes—a non-involvement
condition. With these conditions on the table, we will then be in position
to ask how they apply (or fail to apply) to God.3 We will also be in position
to make a sharp distinction between the question of God’s standing and the
question of God’s perfection (and some related questions besides). I go on to
contend that, on reflection, Cohen’s two conditions in fact reduce to a single
condition of moral commitment. The question whether God has standing,
then, becomes the question whether, despite God’s providential activities,
God can plausibly still be morally committed to the values that would condemn what we do. I then turn to assess the pictures of God associated with
open theism and theological determinism, and consider whether God has
the moral standing to blame, so construed, on those pictures.
Cohen on Hypocrisy and Involvement
Cohen’s paper is one of the first to explicitly focus on the issues here at
stake, and is worth quoting at length. He introduces the relevant topic as
follows:
We can distinguish three ways in which a person may seek to silence, or to
blunt the edge of, a critic’s condemnation. First, she may seek to show that
she did not, in fact, perform the action under criticism. Second, and without denying that she performed that action, she may claim that the action
does not warrant moral condemnation, because there was an adequate justification for it, or at least a legitimate excuse for performing it. Third, while
not denying that the action was performed, and that it is to be condemned
(which is not to say: while agreeing that it is to be condemned), she can seek
to discredit her critic’s assertion of her standing as a good faith condemner
of the relevant action.4

3
I first discussed Cohen’s account of moral standing in my “Manipulation and Moral
Standing,” and have further discussed it in my “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to
Blame.” Some of the material in the next two sections is borrowed from these two papers.
In effect, in the next two sections, I quickly explain one of the main results defended in “A
Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.” The overarching point of this paper is to
apply this result to the case of God. However, in order to apply this result, I first must repeat
some aspects of it here.
4
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 119.
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It is this third way of responding to a critic’s blame that Cohen is interested in, and here he identifies two different versions of such a response:
The first of these techniques for compromising a critic’s voice was signalled
in my childhood by the retort “Look who’s talking!” Shapiro might say,
“Hey, Goldstein, how come you didn’t come to the club last night? All the
guys were expecting you.” And Goldstein might reply: “Look who’s talking.
Twice last week, you didn’t show up.” Unless Shapiro could now point to
some relevant difference, his power to condemn was compromised, whether
or not the criticism he originally made of Goldstein was sound.5
For that first type of would-be discrediting response I have three good
labels: “look who’s talking,” “pot calling the kettle black,” and “tu quoque.”
For my contrasting second type I have no good vernacular or Latin tag. But I
will point you in the right direction by reminding you of retorts to criticism
like “you made me do it,” and “you started it,” even though those phrases
don’t cover all the variants of the second type. I shall name the second type
“You’re involved in it yourself,” but if anybody can think of a better name,
then suggestions are welcome.6

Cohen, then, explicitly contrasts the “non-involvement” condition with
the “non-hypocrisy” condition.7 He goes on:
In this second type of silencing response you are disabled from condemning
me not because you are responsible for something similar or worse yourself
but because you bear at least some responsibility for the very thing that you
seek to criticize. My Nazi superior cannot condemn me for doing what he
orders me on pain of death to do, even if I should disobey, and accept death.8

Note: Cohen here puts his point in terms of responsibility. The idea seems
to be that if you are responsible for someone’s wrongdoing, you cannot
criticize that wrongdoing. He elaborates as follows:
I said earlier that among the variants of this second way of deflecting criticism . . . are “You started it” and “You made me do it”: the reply has many
variants, with “It’s your fault that I did it” at one kind of extreme and “You
helped me to do it” at another. And note that if it’s your fault, in whole or
in part, that I did it, then it can be your fault for structurally different reasons. Here’s part of the relevant wide array: you ordered me to do it, you
asked me to do it, you forced me to do it, you left me with no reasonable
alternative, you gave me the means to do it (perhaps by selling me the arms
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 121–122.
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 123.
7
This contrast also appears in a series of recent papers (Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal
Responsibility,” Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial,” and
Watson, “A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law”) regarding a “moral predicament in the
criminal law” (to use the title of Watson’s paper). The topic of these papers is importantly
parallel to the issues I consider here. For these authors, the question is whether the state is
morally permitted to hold certain wrongdoers criminally responsible for their crimes, when
the state is (arguably) complicit in (or otherwise partially responsible for) those very crimes.
Precisely how tight the analogy is to God’s holding us responsible (given a certain model of
providence) is a question I will not pursue.
8
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 124.
5
6
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that I needed). When such responses from a criticized agent are in place,
they compromise criticism that comes from the now impugned critic, while
leaving third parties entirely free to criticize that agent.9

Finally, Cohen writes:
The general form of “You’re involved in it yourself” is this: you are implicated in the commission of this very act, as its co-responsible stimulus, commander, coercer, guard, assistant, or whatever (whether or not what you did
was wrong, or similar to what I did, or worse than what I did).10

So much for Cohen’s two conditions. Now we can begin to ask how these
might apply to God. As a first approximation, the charge of involvement
certainly seems more promising—and more relevant—than the charge of
hypocrisy. If God blames me for stealing a bicycle, it seems doubtful that I
could reply that God himself has stolen bicycles, so had better keep quiet.
The charge of involvement, however, seems more pressing. For on any conception of God, there will be a sense in which God gave me the “means”
to steal the bicycle, and on any conception of God, God was in position to
prevent my stealing the bicycle, and yet did not—and so is, to that extent, responsible for the fact that I did end up stealing it. And on some conceptions
of God (to be discussed shortly), God is himself responsible for my stealing
the bicycle, precisely on grounds that—in some sense—God himself caused
me to do so (along with everything else). And so whereas it is doubtful that
I could object to God’s blame on grounds that God has done something
similar himself, it does seem that I may be able to object on grounds that
God is himself responsible for the very thing he is condemning. This is the
problem of the divine moral standing to blame.
I will return to the conditions on “moral standing” as proposed by
Cohen shortly. At this stage, however, it is crucial to see how the problem
of divine standing is distinct from—albeit related to—the more familiar
problem of evil. We can bring out the distinction as follows. Suppose that
there is, in fact, an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the universe. The
problem of evil, in short, is this: In view of the facts of evil, how could any
such creator nevertheless be morally perfect? If we hold fixed omnipotence and omniscience, then we’ll have to forego moral perfection. (And
if it is essential to being “God” that one is morally perfect, we’ll have to
say that any such creator is not, in fact, God.) But the problem of divine
standing is distinct from this problem. The problem of standing is this:
in view of how such a creator would be (or, on some given conception,
is) involved in our actions, how could that creator nevertheless have the
standing to blame us? And here we must make two points. First, some
will contend that even if the problem of evil is solved, so that the given
creator is, in fact, morally perfect, nevertheless that creator could lack the
standing to blame. And, second, even if such a creator has the standing to
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone,” 126.
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone, 127.
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blame, it doesn’t follow that this creator in fact must be perfect. The two
problems are, in this way, distinct.
Consider the former claim first, and recall Cohen’s articulation of the
“general form” of the “you’re involved in it yourself” response to the critic:
You are implicated in the commission of this very act, as its co-responsible
stimulus, commander, coercer, guard, assistant, or whatever (whether or not
what you did was wrong, or similar to what I did, or worse than what I did).

From this passage, it can seem that Cohen endorses the possibility of what
we might call no-fault loss of standing. Because you are implicated in the
commission of this very act, you can’t blame me—whether or not what you
did was wrong. For Cohen, then, it would appear that the “you’re involved
in it yourself” response does not turn on a claim of wrongful or criticizable
involvement. One’s involvement might remove one’s standing to blame,
even if that involvement was itself faultless or blameless. We might put
the point like this. For Cohen, one’s involvement in (and responsibility for)
someone else’s wrongdoing may be blameless—but it may nevertheless
leave a sort of “moral residue,” which residue implies that one is morally
disabled from criticizing that wrongdoing, even if that wrongdoing objectively deserves criticism.11 But on such a conception of moral standing, it
would not follow simply from God’s being perfect that God would thereby
have standing. God’s providential activities in governing the world may
be perfectly upstanding, and perfectly blameless, and yet nevertheless, in
virtue of those activities, God may lack the standing to blame. Presumably, then, Cohen (and those like him) would not be content merely with
a defense of the claim that God’s involvement was blameless. That, they
may say, isn’t the point. Their point isn’t that God did something wrong.
Their point is that, whether or not God did something wrong, God is involved, and so God is in no position to blame.
Whether there can be “no fault” loss of standing is of central importance concerning whether God could have the standing to blame, and I
turn briefly to this question shortly. Consider first, however, the second
point noted above—the point that the relevant creator might have standing
even if that creator isn’t perfect. Theists, of course, would regard it as a
pyrrhic victory if they could successfully defend God’s standing, but not
God’s perfection. At the same time, it will be an important conceptual
point in what follows that the creator needn’t be perfect in order to have
standing to blame. (After all, none of us are perfect, but presumably some
of us do have standing.12) We will consider, in turn, various challenges to
11
King, in a recent paper (“Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame”),
explicitly defends this conception of moral standing and the “involvement” condition.
Lippert-Rasmussen (“Who Can I Blame?,” 299) seems open to the possibility as well. For an
interesting discussion of the concept of “moral residue” (albeit in a different context than the
one at issue here), see Stump, “Personal Relations and Moral Residue.”
12
Of course, this claim might be challenged; in fact, this claim was seemingly challenged
by Jesus in the famous episode of the woman caught in adultery. Here Jesus says: “He who
is without sin may cast the first stone,” not “He who has not committed adultery may cast
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God’s standing, and it is crucial to see that the resources needed to defend
God’s standing are different from (and more minimal than) those needed
to defend God’s perfection. The questions are simply different questions,
and the issues different issues.
Against “No Fault” Loss of Standing—And Towards a Unified Account
Here, I turn to the question raised above: can there be “no fault” loss of
standing? I certainly cannot claim fully to resolve this question here. I
contend, however, that the cases to which Cohen points do not adequately
support this possibility.13
Recall that it is crucial to the phenomenon under consideration that it
may apply, even if we grant that the relevant target is morally responsible.
That is, what we’re interested in is the conditions under which one lacks
standing to blame someone who is in fact a morally responsible wrongdoer. However, I contend that, when we investigate Cohen’s imagined
“wide array” of responses more carefully, they work in either one of two
ways: first, by indicating that the involvement took away (or at least diminished) the target’s freedom, and therefore also his moral responsibility,
or second, by indicating something about the would-be blamer’s commitment to the relevant values. In neither case, however, is mere involvement
doing the work to undermine one’s standing to blame someone who is in
fact morally responsible. More particularly, if one’s “involvement” implies
one’s lack of standing, this is because, at a minimum, it implies a fault.
In explanation, consider first, “You forced me to do it.” It is, in a sense,
easy to see how “You forced me to do it” might disable criticism: insofar as
one was forced to do what one does, one isn’t responsible. Similar remarks
apply to “You made me do it,” “You coerced me into doing it,” and “You
left me with no reasonable alternative.” If your involvement in my coming
to do something left me with no reasonable alternative to doing it, then
your involvement seemingly took away my freedom with respect to doing
it; instead, I was forced, and so not responsible. However, insofar as one’s
response to a critic serves to indicate that one is not even responsible, we
do not here have an instance of the kind of response at issue—one that
explicitly does not deny one’s responsibility. In short, the “reply” to God
we are considering in this paper is not “You made me to do it, so I’m not
responsible,” but instead, “Even if I’m responsible, you can’t blame me.”
However, if the response does not work by indicating one’s nonresponsibility, I claim, then it works only by indicating something further
about the blamer—beyond the blamer’s mere responsibility for what one
does. To see this point, we must consider Cohen’s other examples:
the first stone.” If the idea here is that only the sinless are in position to condemn, then the
implication is that none of us are in position to condemn. Readers may make of this suggestion what they will.
13
Again, I more fully develop these points in Todd, “A Unified Account of the Moral
Standing to Blame,” and some of the material in this section is borrowed from Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” and Todd, “A Unified Account.”
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• You helped me to do it.
• You asked me to do it.
• You gave me the means to do it.
• You commanded me to do it.

Crucially, I contend that, in all of these cases, there are ways in which
one might have done the thing in question, and thereby be responsible
(even morally responsible) for what the given person does, and yet one’s
standing to blame her remains intact. Such cases all display a similar
structure—a structure we can bring out by considering Cohen’s case of
the Nazi commander.
Now, Cohen certainly seems right that the typical Nazi commander
lacks the standing to blame his soldiers for faithfully following his orders,
even if such orders should be disobeyed. Importantly, however, what
accounts for this fact is not merely that the commander is (morally) responsible for what his soldiers do when following his orders. Rather, this is
because, for the typical commander, any criticism he might direct towards
his soldiers for faithfully following his commands would have to be—in a
sense to be explained—“hypocritical.” Consider the case of Steffen:
Steffen is a typical Nazi commander working in a death camp. He hears
rumors of an escape attempt. Thus, he orders Thomas to investigate
the fence and sound the alarm, should he see any prisoners escaping.
Thomas sees the prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are
caught and executed. Now, Thomas should have let the prisoners go; he
should have had mercy and simply reported back to Steffen that there
was nothing to the rumors. But he doesn’t.
In this case, of course, Steffen lacks the standing to blame Thomas for
sounding the alarm. Indeed, absent further details, the case can seem unintelligible: why would Steffen—a typical Nazi commander, and someone
who presumably endorses actions such as Thomas’s—be blaming Thomas
for what he does?
Consider Jonas, however:
Jonas is a Nazi commander working in a death camp. However, unlike Steffen, Jonas is secretly opposed to the Nazi regime. He thus does
everything within his power to save the lives of as many prisoners
as possible, consistent, of course, with maintaining his position as a
committed Nazi; Jonas (correctly) reasons that he can do much more
good secretly sabotaging the Nazi efforts as a trusted commander than
he could by open defiance. Jonas hears rumors of an escape. In order
to keep appearances, he must order someone to investigate the fence.
Jonas thus orders Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the alarm
should he see anyone attempting escape. Jonas chose Thomas for this
task because he (blamelessly, though incorrectly) thought that, of all
the people he might choose, Thomas would be the most likely to have
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mercy and not sound the alarm should he actually find prisoners escaping, and instead report back that there was nothing to the rumors.
Instead, however, Thomas discovers the escaping prisoners, sounds the
alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed.
It seems clear that, in this case, Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas
for sounding the alarm. Hearing the alarm, it seems perfectly appropriate
for Jonas to inwardly condemn Thomas for not showing mercy. And later
Jonas might confront Thomas about his act. Thomas might say, “But you
ordered me to do it!” And Jonas might reply: “Yes, I ordered you to do
it, but that gives you no excuse; you should have disobeyed my orders,
even at great risk to yourself.” What, then, makes the difference (in moral
standing) between Jonas and Steffen? Well, it is not that whereas Steffen is
responsible for what Thomas did, Jonas is not. Jonas is responsible for what
Thomas did; anyway, if Steffen is, so is Jonas. That is, both are morally responsible for what Thomas did, at least to the extent that commanders are
morally responsible for what their soldiers do when faithfully following
their orders. Yet Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas.
Similar cases might be constructed for Cohen’s other imagined responses. In each case, one might be “involved in” (and thereby morally
responsible for) the relevant wrongdoing in the alleged way, yet retain the
standing to blame. In these cases, we might say something like:
• Yes, I helped you to do it—but that was because I had no other choice.
You should have refused my help.
• Yes, I asked you to do it—but that was because [ . . . ] . You shouldn’t
have done what I asked.
• Yes, I gave you the means to do it, but that was because [ . . . ] . You
still shouldn’t have done what you did.
The result is this: If the involvement is faultless, then, very plausibly, it
does not, in itself, remove one’s standing to blame. It is, at most, only a
particular kind of involvement that removes standing—a kind that indicates something further. What, then, is this something further?
A natural suggestion is that involvement removes standing only when
it indicates a lack of commitment to the values that would condemn the
wrongdoer’s actions. (I will not attempt fully to analyze the sort of commitment at issue; however, it consists, minimally, in endorsement of the
value as a genuine value, together with at least some degree of motivation
oneself to act in accordance with the value.) Consider Steffen. What is it,
exactly, that is so problematic about Steffen’s purporting now to blame
Thomas for sounding the alarm, after having commanded him to do so? It
is, presumably, that the very fact that Steffen commanded Thomas to do so
is excellent evidence of something, viz., Steffen’s own endorsement (or at the
very least, non-condemnation) of Thomas’s actions. On being confronted
by the allies after the war, for instance, Steffen cannot—on pain of the
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sheerest hypocrisy—now turn around and criticize Thomas for what he
did, unless, at a minimum, he is prepared now also to condemn himself.
Absent some strong indication of such a moral transformation, however,
Thomas would be entitled to reject Steffen’s criticism as entirely hypocritical—as motivated only by an attempt to save his own skin, say, or anyway
not by concern for the given victims. But note: here the worry turns out
to be in the arena of “hypocrisy”—that Steffen’s purported condemnation
of Thomas would have to be (in some relevant sense) hypocritical, or in
bad moral faith. And now we are back to the non-hypocrisy condition.
Steffen’s “involvement” in what Thomas did has dropped out.
At this stage, then, we may begin to see the fundamental similarity
of the two sorts of “replies” Cohen identifies—a similarity Cohen’s discussion seems to obscure. In essence, we have two versions of what is
fundamentally the same response:
Who are you to blame me? Your past behavior reveals your own noncommitment to the values that would condemn what I did.
Who are you to blame me? Your involvement in my action reveals your
own non-commitment to the values that would condemn what I did.
What we have here, then, are simply two different sources of evidence of
one and the same thing. But it is, plausibly, this one thing that removes
standing.
At this point, then, we may note the following. What is important concerning someone’s standing is not whether that person is involved in one’s
wrongdoing, but what that involvement says about that person’s values
and moral commitments. As concerns God’s standing to blame, then, the
question becomes this: Despite God’s providential activities, can God
plausibly still be morally committed to the values that would condemn
what we do? With this in mind, I turn now to assess whether God has the
moral standing to blame, on open theism and on theological determinism.
Open Theism
The basic thrust of open theism is as follows. God is omnipotent and omniscient, but, since incompatibilism is true and not even God could know
in advance the outcome of a genuinely indeterministic process, not even
God can know in advance what a free agent would do in a circumstance
in which she is free. Thus, God’s creative activities are not informed by a
knowledge of what free agents will do in response to the circumstances
God creates. God nevertheless judges that it is worth creating such free
agents, but in doing so takes a risk—the risk that they will act badly. And
we have, in fact, acted badly. Of course, much more could be said about
the theological picture motivating open theism. But the following point
seems to be in order: open theism, we might say, is a model of providence
invented precisely in order to secure God’s standing to blame. First, so
long as free will is possible to give, then, on open theism, God gives us
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free will. And God’s “involvement” in our wrong actions is, apparently,
limited simply to creating the general circumstances in which we act, and
not preventing us from acting in those ways.14 Accordingly, the standing
of the God of open theism is not often challenged.15 In fact, I have been
able to locate only one such challenge—or something close to it—in the
literature. In a recent essay, Derk Pereboom writes:
But even given libertarianism about our free will and Open Theism, such
[divine] expressions of frustration would often have to be misleading as
well. A study from New Zealand released in 2002 indicates that 85 percent of
boys who have a weakened version of a gene that controls production of an
enzyme called monoamine oxidase A—which breaks down key neurotransmitters linked with mood, aggression, and pleasure—and who were abused
turned to criminal or antisocial behavior. Open Theists hold that God could
have prevented the genetic defect, and could also have prevented the violence. Wouldn’t God’s expressing frustration with their behavior also seem
somewhat disingenuous? More generally, many people have natural dispositions that incline them to bad behavior, while others do not. Wouldn’t most
divine expression of frustration with especially bad behavior be suspect,
given that God could have created all of us with the best sort of dispositions
we find among human beings?16

The response to one aspect of Pereboom’s challenge seems clear: God
would tailor God’s expressions of frustration precisely to the degree that
is warranted by the degree of blameworthiness in question. Indeed, this
much is guaranteed, one might say, by God’s perfect moral goodness,
together with God’s omniscience. In this case, then, God will of course
not express disproportionate frustration with the behavior of the relevant
boys. However, if the given genetic defect indeed left them to some degree
responsible, then God will express frustration with them (if he does so)
commensurate with that degree. More simply, God is perfectly aware—far
more intimately than we are—of what mitigating circumstances affect our
blameworthiness. And God takes these circumstances perfectly and precisely into account when and if God blames us.
Of course, there is another aspect of Pereboom’s challenge, and that
is simply that God has failed to prevent the relevant instances of wrongdoing. And how can one appropriately express frustration towards what
14
For an exposition and defense of the open theist model of providence, see especially
Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, and Geach, Providence and Evil. For criticism,
see, e.g., Kvanvig, Destiny and Deliberation, chapter 4. Open theism is also often motivated
philosophically simply on grounds that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human
freedom. For this sort of defense of open theism, see Prior, “The Formalities of Omniscience,”
Lucas, The Future, Todd, “Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence,” Swinburne, The
Coherence of Theism, chapter 10, and van Inwagen, “What Does an Omniscient Being Know
about the Future?” For further discussion of the problem of foreknowledge and freedom,
see, e.g., Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, and Todd and Fischer, “Introduction,” (in Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge).
15
However, philosophers do sometimes contend (e.g., Flint, Divine Providence, 104–105,
Kvanvig, Destiny and Deliberation, xii) that open theism makes the problem of evil worse.
16
Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 128.
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one was in position to prevent but decided not to prevent? More particularly, Pereboom’s discussion suggests the following sort of principle:
If one was in position to prevent someone’s morally wrong action, but
one intentionally does not prevent that person’s action, then one cannot
appropriately blame that person for performing that action.
But this principle seems false. Suppose a terrorist credibly threatens Nigel:
kill those five people, or I will kill these twenty. Nigel deliberates, and is
in position to prevent the terrorist’s wrong action of killing the twenty. He
doesn’t, on grounds that he has a policy of not giving in to this kind of
moral blackmail. But, when the terrorist does in fact kill the twenty, Nigel
is certainly in position to blame him for doing so. (Other examples might
be constructed.) The point, then, is this: the mere fact that God hasn’t prevented the relevant wrongdoing does not, by itself, show that God cannot
criticize that wrongdoing. In particular, that God did not prevent the
wrongdoing does not, by itself, tell us that God does not condemn this
wrongdoing. The permission of the wrongdoing may have been reluctant
permission.
Of course, some will want to say that there is a crucial difference here:
whereas Nigel was justified in (or had an excuse for) not preventing the
terrorist’s wrong action (at least according to non-consequentialists), God
has no excuse for failing to prevent our wrong actions. In particular, if
God exists as imagined by open theists, then clearly God currently has
something like a policy of not preventing all of the wrong actions we may
perform. (I do not say that God clearly has a policy of not preventing any
such actions; perhaps God is indeed, unbeknownst to us, preventing a
great deal of wrongdoing that would otherwise occur, but for his actions.)
However, certain proponents of the problem of evil may claim that God is
not justified in adopting this sort of policy: God should adopt the policy
of never allowing anyone ever to perform morally wrong actions. But now
the point is clear. Here we are simply considering the problem of evil—or
some aspect of the problem of evil. The proponent of this problem may
grant that the mere fact that God hasn’t prevented the wrongdoing does
not imply that God does not condemn this wrongdoing; she may admit
that God does condemn it, appropriately so, and even that therefore God
has “standing.” Nevertheless, she maintains that God’s decision in this
regard is in fact morally wrong. Thus, she contends that, in point of fact,
the person we have been calling “God” cannot be God—cannot be, inter
alia, morally perfect, whether or not this person has standing.
Whether God could be justified in adopting the policy of not always
preventing wrongdoing is a question I will not pursue. I simply note that
this is a different question than the question whether God has standing.
And, from the considerations adduced so far, we have no reason, I believe,
to say that God lacks the standing to blame, given open theism. At most,
what we could claim is that God has mistaken priorities: there is wrongdoing that God should prevent but does not prevent. But not every way
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of being morally mistaken is a way of lacking standing. (“OK, maybe I’m
not perfect, but that doesn’t mean I can’t criticize you.”) More particularly,
an omnipotent, omniscient creator who leaves agents indeterministicallyfree to evolve “on their own” may have the moral standing to blame those
agents, if they do wrong, even if that creator did something wrong (for
instance) in creating those creatures (in those conditions) in the first place,
or does something wrong in failing to intervene more radically in their
affairs. Whether God does do something wrong in this way, is, of course, a
complicated question, and open theists have certainly tried to address it.
But once more, we do not have a clear reason to suppose that the God of
open theism lacks standing.
Theological Determinism
I turn now to the “model of providence” that makes God’s standing to
blame considerably more difficult to defend: theological determinism.
Now, theological determinism is sometimes defined in different ways, and
here we might detain ourselves for some time regarding different versions
of the view, different versions of “determinism,” and yet more besides.
These are difficult matters.17 Heath White, for instance, has recently defined theological determinism as follows:
Theological determinism: (i) the facts about God’s will wholly determine every
other contingent fact, and (ii) the facts about God’s will explain every other
contingent fact.18

And this is a sensible definition—but it doesn’t, in itself, amount to a
deterministic “model of providence.” Here, then, I will have recourse to
a familiar analogy often employed in these contexts: the analogy of an
author and a script.19 On theological determinism, God constructs an
entire “script” representing a complete universe, and then, well, brings
that script to life. (We might also say that God inspects all of the possible
scripts—they are just there—and then decides to make one of them actual.
I’m indifferent.) The theological determinist adds that this script is the best
of all—or anyway amongst the best of all—possible scripts. (The idea here,
I hope, is familiar.) Further, and crucially, the theological determinist is a
compatibilist.20 Accordingly, though God determines the script to unfold “as
written,” we are, nevertheless, free and responsible. In short: God writes
the script in such a way that we meet all of the compatibilist’s conditions
17
For some of the various complexities regarding “determinism” in this context, see
Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence, 81–90.
18
White, “Theological Determinism and the ‘Authoring Sin’ Objection,” 81.
19
E.g., Ross, Philosophical Theology, 257–269. White (“Theological Determinism,” 81) also
endorses the analogy, so long as we keep in mind, as surely we must, that “God does not
create representations of agents but the real thing.”
20
Derk Pereboom (“Libertarianism and Theological Determinism”), however, defends
an incompatibilist version of theological determinism, on which we simply aren’t morally
responsible (in what he calls the “basic desert” sense).
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on freedom and responsibility. The theological determinist thus contends
that we are responsible for what we do, despite being determined, in this
way, by God.
Now, if we employ the analogy of author and script, and if we understand “moral standing” as we have above, the crucial question is this: What
can we gather about the character and values of an author by inspection of
that author’s story? And here we must insist on the following point: from
the mere fact that an author includes some given action in a “script,” it
does not follow that that author approves of that action (or such actions),
considered in itself (or themselves). Making this crucial point, Ross writes
as follows:
It should be obvious that “God wills that Jones stab Smith” does not entail
“God approves of Jones’ conduct in his act of stabbing Smith.”21

And this opens up the space to see how, on theological determinism, God
might nevertheless have the moral standing to blame. Now, no one, as far
as I have been able to see, has articulated a complaint against theological
determinism precisely on grounds that it cannot accommodate God’s
moral standing to blame. The author that has, in my opinion, come nearest
to articulating this problem is William Hasker.22 In his paper “The Antinomies of Divine Providence,” Hasker considers two such “antinomies,” the
first of which is the familiar problem of how God’s control can be consistent with our control, and the second of which is the “antinomy of divine
planning and pathos.” Concerning this latter antinomy, Hasker writes:
[The antinomy] may be stated as follows: God has a detailed plan for everything
that occurs in the world, yet God exhibits powerful affective responses to the various
things that take place. Unlike the antinomy of divine and human control, this
antinomy does not even have the appearance of a formal contradiction. Yet
there does seem to be at the very least a strong incongruity: if everything
that happens is in accord with God’s plan, then why is God so powerfully
affected by these events when they occur?23

On reflection, however, Hasker’s concern is not so much how God could
have the moral standing to blame, but why it is that God would even blame in
the first place. Nevertheless, in considering God’s moral standing on theological determinism, it will be important carefully to consider Hasker’s
claims. Hasker writes:
If indeed God has a detailed plan for everything that occurs in the world,
and everything that takes place is strictly in accord with that plan, then how
Ross, Philosophical Theology, 263.
Something in the neighborhood of this problem is often hinted at, but not fully addressed.
For instance, Vivian writes: “The Calvinists and the Jansenists fully realised the contradiction and were prepared to sacrifice free will, undismayed by the absurdity of making God
both Creator and Judge” (Human Freedom and Responsibility, 76). For further reflections “in
the neighborhood,” see Sommers’s discussion of the Calvinist views of Jonathan Edwards
(Relative Justice, 73–83), and Le Poidevin, “Autonomous Agents or God’s Automata?”
23
Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 158.
21
22
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is it possible . . . to understand [God’s] anger against sin? . . . The situation
is particularly difficult for [theological determinism], for on this view everything that takes place is exactly as God wishes it to be; there is no possible world God
would prefer to the actual world in any respect. If we are told, then, that God has
a deep and abiding anger at the unrighteousness that takes place on earth,
our only possible response is that this simply cannot be: to represent God as
angry and hostile to situations which are exactly as he wishes them to be, is
just incoherent—or worse, it is to represent God as afflicted with something
like schizophrenia.24

Now, an important part of what Hasker says here is simply false. Hasker
says that, on theological determinism, there is no possible world God would
prefer to the actual world in any respect. But this is false. God might—and,
I think, certainly would—prefer some other given possible worlds to the
actual world in certain respects. For instance: God might prefer some other
possible world in this respect: it doesn’t contain Jones’s lie, whereas this
world (the actual world) does. That, God agrees, is a good-making feature
of that other world as opposed to this one. What follows instead from theological determinism is simply that there is no world that God prefers to the
actual world all things considered. Some other worlds may be vastly preferable to the actual world in this respect or other. It is just that no other world
is preferable to the actual world in total or in the final analysis. Hasker has
simply misrepresented the commitments of the theological determinist.
The problem of divine “schizophrenia,” then, can be dissolved. It isn’t
as if, at first, when God is constructing the story of the world, God has a
preference for (or otherwise enjoys the thought of) lies, and so includes
some lies in the relevant “script” for that reason. No. All along, God does
not like (that is, condemns) lies. But what God also likes—and is justified in liking—is an overall excellent script, and God realizes that the best
overall script will be one that includes some lies, so God includes them.
When those lies in fact come to pass, precisely as God determined, no
sudden attitude change is required in order for God to condemn them:
God needn’t go from having preferred or endorsed lying to now condemning
lying. God never endorsed lying to begin with, and God has condemned
lying all along. Importantly, from the mere fact that God has included
some lies in the relevant script, it does not follow that God approves of
(or otherwise endorses) lying. So it seems that what Hasker says could not
possibly be could easily be.
Hasker, however, is not alone in suspecting that there would have to
be a deep attitudinal tension in God, according to traditional theological
determinism.25 Albert Einstein, for instance, once wrote as follows:
Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 160.
Cf. Jerry Walls, “One Hell of a Problem for Christian Compatibilists,” 89: “The notion
that God is angry at sins he himself determines, when he could have determined things
otherwise, and then pours out his wrath on those same actions is puzzling in the extreme,
to say the least.” Walls here seems to be intimating that there is puzzle concerning how the
relevant set of divine attitudes is coherent or consistent. It is this complaint that I believe
has an adequate answer. Note, even though Walls is an incompatibilist, the implication of
24
25
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Nobody, certainly, will deny that the idea of the existence of an omnipotent,
just, and omnibenevolent personal God is able to accord man solace, help,
and guidance. . . . But, on the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses
attached to this idea in itself, which have been painfully felt since the beginning . . . if this being is omnipotent then every occurrence, including every
human thought, and every human feeling and aspiration, is also his work.
How is it possible to think of holding men responsible for their deeds and
thoughts before such an almighty Being? In giving out punishments and
rewards he would be . . . passing judgment on himself.26

Now, Einstein was, of course, Einstein—but here he can be seen to be
making a mistake. First, note that Einstein asks what seems to be a reasonable question: in virtue of the fact that every human action is determined
by God, how could it be reasonable to hold human beings responsible?
This is, however, simply the question of the incompatibilist. (Note, in particular, that Einstein does not ask how it is possible for God to hold humans
responsible, but how this is possible simpliciter.) But even if Einstein’s
question is a reasonable one, his further contention seems to be misplaced.
Here Einstein contends that “In giving out punishments and rewards he
would be . . . passing judgment on himself.” But this is false.
To explain. Suppose that theological determinism is true, and God criticizes Jones for lying. Is God therefore judging himself for lying? Of course
not; God didn’t lie. Of course, God did bring it about that Jones will lie, but
to bring it about that someone will lie is not thereby to lie (let alone oneself
to perform numerically the same action as the action brought about).27
Perhaps, then, the idea is that, if God passes judgment on Jones for lying,
God would have to pass judgment on himself for bringing it about that
Jones lies. But here we must be careful. For whereas God will accept
responsibility for bringing it about that Jones lies (given theological determinism, this much cannot be denied), God will not—naturally—criticize
himself for bringing this about. Indeed, if anything, God will congratulate
himself, since God recognizes that Jones’s lying (at the relevant time and
in the relevant way) is an essential part of the overall excellent script the
realization of which God is executing.
Now, some may wish to say that this contention is implausible—that
it is implausible that a lie would be, in this way, a necessary part of the
best (or one of the best . . . ) of all possible worlds (or perhaps that, even
if it were, God would be permitted to bring it about). But here, once
more, we simply encounter a different problem: the problem of evil. The
this passage does not seem to be simply that it is puzzling how God might regard it as fair
to blame or punish people for performing actions he determined them to perform. What is
puzzling, according to this suggestion, is something like the (alleged) attitudinal change that
would have to be required in order for God to condemn what he had previously determined.
Hasker makes similar points elsewhere in his work, e.g., Providence, Evil, and the Openness of
God, 133.
26
Einstein, Out of My Later Years, 26–27.
27
Cf. Ross, Philosophical Theology, 261: “God does not pick a man’s pocket when I do or
help a blind man across the street when I do.”
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important point, at this stage, is the following: there is no reason, given
theological determinism, that in criticizing Jones for lying, in order to
maintain psychological consistency, God would also have to be (implausibly) criticizing himself. For whereas creatures do something wrong when
they act wrongly, God will maintain that he does not do wrong when he
acts so as to bring about those wrongs, given their role in the overall fabric
of reality. At the very least, it is this thesis that Einstein ought to target,
if he wants to object to traditional theism. But to target this thesis is to
take up the problem of evil; it is to challenge the thesis that God could be
morally perfect, given that God sometimes determines wrongdoing. The
seeming problem of attitudinal consistency—that God would be “judging
himself”—has disappeared.
But perhaps we should slow down, for I seem to be saying that there
can be no moral objection to God’s both determining creatures to perform
various wrong actions and blaming them for performing those actions,
whereas I expect that many readers will suppose that there is indeed—
there must be!—available such an objection. But my point here is not that
there can be no such moral objection. My point, instead, is that given compatibilism there can be no such objection.
Paul Russell, himself a naturalist and a compatibilist, however, disagrees. Russell’s position is as follows. As concerns our own responsibility,
there is no morally important difference between the deterministic causes
of our actions just being there and their instead being there as a result of
someone’s agency. Naturalist compatibilists, he thinks, therefore must
admit that human moral responsibility is—in principle—compatible with
the truth of a doctrine like theological determinism.28 Now, if you think
that this result, in itself, is a bad result for compatibilists, then you agree
with contemporary incompatibilists who have developed so-called “manipulation arguments” for incompatibilism.29 Russell, however, wishes to
take at least some of the sting out of this result, by claiming that whereas
we may appropriately blame each other on such a view, God, at any rate,
cannot. As I hope will become clear, however, I do not see that Russell has
made a good case for this conclusion. Russell begins as follows:
We might say that since B controls A’s agency there is insufficient causal distance between them to sustain the reactive stance. Moral communication
and responsiveness presupposes that agents are not related to each other
as controller and controlee. When a controller takes up an evaluative/reactive stance toward an agent he controls there is plainly an element of fraud

28
As other such philosophers regularly do admit. See, e.g., Watson, Agency and Answerability, 214, on a Leibnizian God, and Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, 103–116, on the same.
Neither Watson nor Wolf, however, address the question of what attitudes God would or
could have towards God’s creatures.
29
For more on which see, e.g., Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 64–78, Pereboom, Free
Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, chapter 4, Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, chapter 1, and
Todd, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” “Defending (a Modified Version of)
the Zygote Argument,” and “Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.”
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or self-deception going on. The controller can only praise or blame himself
for the way in which the agent succeeds or fails to be guided by available
reasons.30

There are least two separate points here. One point is a point to which
we have already responded. It is the claim, assessed above, that there
is an attitudinal “switch” implied by God’s blame which would have to
be incoherent or otherwise “fraudulent.” The second point, however,
is a claim about “causal distance.” On this score, when I read Russell’s
claim, I think: “Spoken like a true incompatibilist”—except that Russell
is not an incompatibilist. On Russell’s view, even though there is “insufficient causal distance” between the controller and the controllee for the
controller appropriately to blame, nevertheless the controller gives the
controlled free will. It is this that I find puzzling and implausible. Whereas I
can certainly understand the claim that there is indeed insufficient causal
distance between the relevant parties for blame to be appropriate, this is
because I can understand the claim that this lack of distance implies (or is
constitutive of) the controlled agent’s lack of freedom. But I cannot understand the claim that there is this “lack of distance,” when the “controlled”
party is indeed free.
It is worth bringing out here the fundamental weakness of Russell’s
compatibilism. If, on your view, God might create a community of
agents and give them free will (and make them fully autonomous and
responsible), and yet there is “insufficient causal distance” between those
creatures and God to license (the in-principle possibility of) God’s holding
them responsible, then the problem here is not with God. It is with your
conception of free will and moral responsibility. It is far more natural to
suppose that there would be such distance in virtue of God’s making such
creatures genuinely free and responsible. On Russell’s view, though God
has indeed given the relevant agents free will, there is still a lack of the
requisite “causal distance,” and so God can only blame himself for how
they use it. This is absurd.
In this light, consider the ways in which the incompatibilist will simply
agree with Russell. Russell writes:
We may say that when the relationship between two individuals is one involving covert control then the participant stance on the side of the controller
is compromised. The controller is not entitled to take a participant stance in
circumstances where he decides when reasons, criticisms, and so on succeed
or fail to move the agent.31

So far, the incompatibilist agrees: when the controller decides when reasons
do or do not move the agent, certainly the agent cannot also be responsible
for when she is or is not moved by such reasons, and in that case the
controller certainly will not be “entitled” to condemn her for how she is or
30
31

Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 159.
Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 160.
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is not so-moved. But this is not, of course, the interpretation of these facts
favored by Russell. Commenting now on the case at hand, Russell writes:
There is something “absurd” about the suggestion that God holds human
beings accountable (in a future state) for events that he ordains.32

Once again, the incompatibilist agrees. There is indeed something absurd
about the suggestion that God holds human beings to account for events
that he ordains, and that is precisely the suggestion that those human beings could be responsible for events God ordains.
However, once more, this is not what Russell means to suggest; Russell
contends that human beings could be responsible for events God ordains.
Russell goes on:
However, in the absence of any relationship of this kind [controller and controllee] the participant stance is not compromised. . . . What is compromised
in these cases is not the agent’s responsibility, as such, but the legitimacy
of the stance of holding an agent responsible on the part of those who covertly
control him.33

Russell’s contention, then, is that others may legitimately blame the controlled agent, although the controllers themselves cannot. Russell explains:
It is indeed illegitimate and inappropriate for God to hold humans accountable in these circumstances, insofar as God covertly controls us and all we
do. [However] it does not follow from the fact that God is in no position to
hold us accountable that we are not (fully) accountable to our fellow human
beings in these circumstances.34

Russell is right. It doesn’t directly follow from God’s not being entitled
to hold us responsible that we simply aren’t responsible. (This is, indeed,
precisely the upshot of the literature on moral standing.) The problem
is that Russell has not explained why God is not entitled to hold us responsible, despite—on his view—making us responsible. Why does God
lack such entitlement? What principle or principles regarding the “moral
standing to blame” would imply that God is not so-entitled? So far, all we
have is the suggestion that there is something “fraudulent” about God’s
stance—but we have seen how such an objection may be answered. We
are simply left with the mere suggestion that there is something “absurd”
about God’s holding human beings responsible for events God ordains.
But whereas there is at hand a ready explanation of this absurdity, this
explanation is that of the incompatibilist.
Here, then, we reach the following conclusion: compatibilists ought
simply to embrace the result that God might have the moral standing to
blame those God determines. This is, I suggest, the best, and the most
principled, compatibilist option available. Such a conclusion, of course,
Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 161.
Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 160.
34
Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 161–162.
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has long since been endorsed by various central philosophical figures in
western theism—and is sometimes similarly embraced in recent times.
Donald M. Mackay, for instance, once wrote:
Insofar as the parallel holds between human and Divine authorship, the
foregoing [compatibilist] analysis may help to draw the fatalistic sting commonly felt in the theological doctrine of predestination; but we may still feel
that if God is our sovereign Author, we cannot be held really responsible—at
least not by Him.35

Mackay, however, ultimately rejects this (he thinks pessimistic) conclusion, writing that
Logically, we can depend for our existence upon the “creative” will of Godin-eternity, and still be answerable for our response as free beings to the
“normative” will of God-in-dialogue.36

There are, to be sure, and as Mackay recognizes, still mysteries associated
with this doctrine, not all of which I have discussed in this essay. But this
doctrine is, I suggest, the most attractive position for any compatibilist to
take—whether theist or not. Compatibilists should, I submit, be compatibilists all the way through. If, however, this doctrine is, for you, one step
too far, then the result is this: for you, compatibilism is one step too far.
Conclusion
It is worth recapping where we’ve been in this paper. One of the most
difficult and contentious questions in the history of western theism has
always been whether divine providence is consistent with creaturely responsibility. Traditional theists, however, do not merely wish to say that
we are responsible, but further wish to say that God holds us responsible.
But here we encounter deep and difficult questions regarding standing—
questions that are just beginning to get the attention they deserve. As I
hope this essay has made clear, however, the question of God’s standing
has not yet received this sort of detailed attention. As I see it, the problem
of God’s standing deserves explicit recognition as a central problem in the
philosophy religion. The problem is not how God could be responsible
for wrongdoing. The problem is not how God could be perfect, given the
facts of evil. The problem is how it could be appropriate for God to blame
us, given how intimately involved God is in what we do. Perhaps, the
theological determinists may say, ignoring this problem is yet one more
mistake which God has determined us to make, but is nevertheless disappointed in us for making. Whatever the case, we should make it no more.37
The University of Edinburgh
Mackay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, 33.
Mackay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, 34.
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